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Abstract: The Serbian question in Bosnia-Herzegovina was the major obsta-
cle to the stabilization of the semi-colonial, repressive and anti-democratic
nile of Austria-Hungary. From the occupation after the Congress of Berlin (1878)
until the First World War. the politics of systematic suppression of the Herze-
govinian and Bosnian Serbs, especially of their freedom of religion. political
rights. and cultural development provoked growing national demands. Tins con-
flict of interests. combined with intensified international crisis in the Balkans di-
rectly led to the Austrian-Serbian war in 1914.
The Eastern Crisis (1875-1878) began with the Serbian insurrec-
tions in Herzegovina and Bosnia, and was ended with the occupation
of these two Ottoman provinces by Austria-Hungary. The period of the
Austro-Hungarian administration - from the occupation (1878) and an-
nexation (1908) to the assassination in Sarajevo (1914) - was the pe-
riod marked by the systematic suppression of the Bosnian Serbs
associated with the restriction of their religious, national and civil
rights. Their striving for national equality went through three succes-
sive stages: 1) the struggle for religious, ecclesiastic and educational
autonomy; 2) political orgaruzing and cultural elevation; 3) revolution-
ary acts based on individual terrorism. The growing discontent of the
rural population, the dominant layer of the Serbian society in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, was the catalyst of the whole movement although in the
beginning it was not directly connected with the actions of the political
and cultural elite
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From the Insurrection to the Occupation
The outcome of the Eastern Crisis marked the defeat of the almost
century-long efforts of the Serbs from either bank of the Drina river to
constitute a single Serbian state from the Ottoman provinces with pre-
dominantly Serbian population and within ethnically determined
boundaries. On several occasions, in spite of unfavorable international
circumstances, the insurgents from Bosnia proclaimed the unification
with Serbia, and those from Herzegovina - with Montenegro. After the
two Serbian principalities declared war on Ottoman Empire, in June
and July 1876 the unification with Serbia was proclaimed in four dif-
ferent locations in Bosnia, where the major part of the insurrection
army was gathered. The proclamation to the people underlined that the
insurgents, as "the only legal representatives of the Serbian land of
Bosnia, after so much waiting and with no hope for any help, [we' de-
cide today to finally break up with the non-Christian government from
Constantinople, and desire to share the destiny, whatever it may be, of
our kinsmen the Serbs." 1 The proclamation of the unification of Bosnia
with Serbia gave rise to "feast and great joy" among the people, and
the insurgents solemnly took an oath to the Serbian Prince MiIan
Obrenovic The Montenegrin Prince Nikola was asked by the Herze-
govinian insurgents to accept the title of sovereign of Herzegovina.
The defeat of the movement for the unification of Bosnia with
Serbia marked a sudden and long lasting break of the policy laid out in
Garasanins Nacertanije (1844), which predicted the unification into
one single Serbian state of all the Serbian-inhabited Ottoman provinces
in Europe. The crushing of the Serbian national movement was held in
Vienna as a precondition for the domination in the Balkans and further
penetration towards the Near East. The Austrian penetration into the
Balkans marked by the occupation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, was the be-
ginning of the "Drang nach Osten" policy. Therefore, the opinion of
the older generation of the American historians has kept its validity
that the real background of the conflict between Austria-Hungary and
Serbia, leading to the World War L was in fact the occupation and an-
nexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina.?
At the Congress of Berlin (June-July 1878), on the suggestion of
Great Britain, Austria-Hungary was authorized to occupy Bosnia with
M. Ekrnecic, Ustanak u Bosni 1875-1978, Sarajevo 1960, p. 231.
2 B. E. Schmidt, The Annexation of Bosnia 1908-1909, Cambridge University Press
1937: idem., The Coming of the TVar, vol. L London- New York 1930, p. 108: J. S.
Ewart, The Roots and Causes ofthe War (1914-1918), vol.Il, New York 1925, p 948.
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Herzegovina (51.000 ktn-'). According to an interpretation from Vi-
enna, "the supremacy of the Slavic race, not inclined at all to be just to
the others" would be thereby avoided. At the same time, Austria-Hun-
gary was allowed to usher its troops into the northern part of the San-
jak of Novi Pazar, the narrow territorial corridor dividing Serbia from
Montenegro, thus impeding their unification In the future. '
The resolutions of the Congress of Berlin were strongly opposed
in Bosnia and Herzegovina. A provisional, Muslim-led government
was formed, calling for resistance to the Austro-Hungarian occupation.
Islamic extremism prevailed among the Muslims: European costume
was forbidden in Sarajevo, and shari 'ah (Islamic law) was introduced
in Mostar." The Serbs, militarily exhausted by constant fightings dur-
ing the four years of the insurrection, sporadically tried to offer
stronger resistance to the occupation, often in alliance with the Mus-
lims. The main resistance to the occupying forces, however, was made
by the Bosnian Muslims, led by the imam and former brigand of Sara-
jevo - Hadzi Lojo: it took the Austrians several months to break down
the resistance. In the first phase of the military intervention, com-
manded by the two generals - von Philippovitch and Jovanovic, and
conducted from three directions, the Austro-Hungarian army engaged
72.000 troops, quickly reaching the figure of 160.000. Due to strong
Serbian resistance in Bosanska Krajina (region of Banja Luka), lasting
for a month after the occupation of Sarajevo (August 19), the Austrian
troops were increased to 268.000 men. The official number of casual-
ties of the occupying army were 5.020 privates and 178 officers. Dur-
ing the Eastern Crisis, Bosnia and Herzegovina lost about 150.000
men, mostly Serbs and Muslims.P
Deeply disappointed with the pro-Bulgarian Russian policy, and
in exchange for the guarantees to the dynasty and vague promises of an
expansion towards the Vardar valley, Prince Mil an Obrenovic of Ser-
bia signed the Secret Convention (Tajna konvencija) in Vienna in
:; Cf (iJaksie, Bosna i Hercegovina na Berlinskom kongresu 1878. SAN. Beograd
1956. Cf. also, M.S.Anderson, The Eastem Question 1774-1923, London-New
York 1966, pp. 214-219.
4 K.Karpat, "The Ottoman Empire Towards the Resistance of Bosnia and
Herzegovina to the Austrian Occupation". in: Otpor austrougarskoj okupaciji
1878. godine u Bosni i Hercegovini, A.NU BiH,Posebna izdanja, knj. XLIII,
Odjeljenje drustvenih nauka, knj. 8 Sarajevo 1979, pp. 155-163.
:) Cf. D. Beric, "Pogled na literaturu (J otporu austrougarskoj okupaciji IR78 u
Bosni i Hercegovini". in: Otpor austrougarsko] okupaciji 1878. godine u Bosni i
Hercegovini, pp. 335-385.
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1881. Serbia thereby 'renounced any form of political engagement in
Bosnia-Herzegovina, which had been the main goal of the Serbian for-
eign policy from 1804 to 1878. Until the beginning of the 20th century.
Serbia was conspicuously absent from Bosnia: Bosnian Serbs were
backed up mainly by the political parties of the opposition (Radicals
and Liberals) and clerical circles of Belgrade. The Austrophile policy
of Milan Obrenovic, as well as the foreign policy of his successor King
Aleksandar (1889-1903), was not very popular among the Serbs, tradi-
tionally inclining towards Russia and with a strong sympathy for the
co-nationals under the foreign rule. King Milan's policy aroused suspi-
cion even among the leadership of the Progressive Party tNaprcdna
stranka), traditionally loyal to the dynasty. Just like King Milan's main
opponents, the Radicals (Narodna radikalna strankas, some of the Pro-
gressists particularly disagreed with hIS policy towards Bosnia, consid-
enng that Milan betrayed the national interest by denying protection
and political support to the Herzegovinian and Bosnian Serbs. During
Alexander's rule, Austro-Hungarian envoys in Serbia frequently com-
plained about the Belgrade press, demanding the suppression of any
free thought, even of a mere mention of national aspirations. Baron
Thornmel, acting as the envoy to Belgrade, carefully marked not only
the unsuitable articles, but also the suspicious expressions pointing to
national interests. The expressions such as "national aspirations",
"Slavic solidarity 11, "repressed brethren", even the term "Serbdom",
provoked his suspicion, and often protests and demands for ban." Ser-
bia was to be absent from Bosnian politics for the next three decades.
"Civilizing Measures"
Bosnia and Herzegovina, the two provinces still formally under
the Ottoman sovereignty, were under the provisions of the imperial or-
der of February 22 1880, administred by the Common Ministry of Fi-
nance in Vienna. Certain economic measures and the introduction of
order into the internal affairs of the provinces made significant changes
in this backward society, but achieved only limited succes. A network
or railroads and factones was unsignificant compared to a huge net-
work of military garrisons, fortresses and gendarmerie positions." Sig-
nificant effort was made in building schools and other cultural
6 S. Jovanovic, Vlada Aleksandra Obrenovica. vol. L Beograd 193 L p. 77.
7 Cf PTSugaL 171e Industrialization of Bosnia-Herzegovina 187{-1918. Seattle
1963. Reviewed bv M. Ekrnecic m: Jugoslovenski istorijski casopis, No 3.
Belgrade 1964, pp. '120-124. . .
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institutions, but the results were insufficient. The "civilizing measures"
of Austria-Hungary were politically aimed at establishing a viable po-
litical system supported by different ethnic communities, whiche were
to be separated from any political contact with their co-nationals else-
where, especially in Serbia and Montenegro. The "civilizing measures"
which were aimed pnmarily against the Serbs as a possible political
opponents, also severely affected the Muslims who were reluctant to
live in a state ruled by a Christian government. The Serbs started to
migrate to Serbia, and the Bosnian Muslims to the neighbouring prov-
inces (Kosovo, Macedonia, even Albania), or to remote regions (Ana-
tolia) under the Ottoman rule.
According to the first Austrian census in 1879, the Orthodox
Serbs made the relative majority of 496.458 persons out of 1.158.164
inhabitants. The same ratio was registered In 1910: in spite of the mi-
grations (by 1914 some 40.000 Serbs had been displaced), the Serbs
had the majority of825.918 out of 1.898.044 inhabitants, due to their
high birth-rate (by the end of the century it reached 35,60 percent in a
87,92 percent-agrarian population), higher than among the Muslims
(some 140.000 had been displaced), and the Roman Catholics who
were systematically settled (about 230.000 people were settled in Bos-
nia nad Herzegovina until 1914, mainly Croats, Czechs and Poles).
The absolute majority of the Serbs was recorded in half the terri-
tories under Austro-Hungarian rule: in the Bosnian districts - Banja
Luka 70,96 percent; Dubica 82,44 percent; Gradiska 71,98 percent;
Bosanska Krupa 64,15 percent; Bosanski Novi 76,06 percent: Bosan-
ski Petrovac 78,83 percent; Kljuc 66,43 percent; Kotor Yaros 63,49
percent; Maglaj 53,55 percent; Prijedor 59,08 percent; Prnjavor 60,89
percent; Sarajevo 56,06 percent; Glamoc 77, 26 percent; Varcar Vakuf
79,61 percent; Bijeljina 70,57 percent: Vlasenica 64,37 percent;
Zvornik 54,78 percent. In Herzegovina, absolute majority was regis-
tered in the following districts: Mostar 6 1,41 percent; Bileca 81,27 per-
cent; Ljubinje 58,40 percent; Nevesinje 73,06 percent, and Trebinje
71,38 percent. 8
8 Bericht uber die Verwaltung von Bosnien und Hercegovina 1913. Wien 1913 ~ Dj.
Pejanovic, Stanovnistvo Bosne i Hercegovine, SAN, Beograd 1955, pp. 40-46. On
schools: Dj. Pejanovic. Stanovnistvo, skolstvo i pismenost u krajevima bivse
Bosne i Hercegovine , Sarajevo 1939, p 12. According to the Austrian military
sources, in 1865 there was 47,76 percent of the Orthodox Serbs, 34,60 percent of
the Muslims, and 15,98 percent of the Roman Catholics in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
Within the borders of the vilayet of Bosnia there was 51,25 percent of Orthodox
Serbs. 32,83 percent of Muslims and 14,25 percent of Roman Catholics. The
official Ottoman census of 1871 revealed that Muslims became relative majority
due to huge emigration of Muslims from Serbia to Bosma after 1867 Cf. 1)).
Pejanovic. Stanovnistvo Bosne i Hercegovine . pro 31-36. .
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The general conscription decreed for Bosnia and Herzegovina
(1881) gave rise to the 1882 insurrection of the Serbs in Herzegovina,
in which a vast number of local Muslims took part, aided by Montene-
gro and the Ottoman government. The insurrection spread across the
Neretva river I11to central and eastern Bosnia, along the Drina river.
The leaders of the insurrection were Stojan Kovacevic. Djoko Radovic
and Pero Tunguz. Due to the lack of arms and of a stronger interna-
tional support, the insurrection was crushed by the 70.000 men strong
Austrian troops. The Austro-Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs
considered this insurrection to be "the last cry of the lethally wounded
Slavism in the Balkans". It seems that the insurrection revived the idea
among the officials 111 Vienna (1882-1883), of the annexation of Bos-
nia-Herzegovina and the abandonment of dualism.')
Contrary to the Muslims, who opposed the new rulers together
with the Serbs, the hope rose among the Croats of Croatia-Slavonia
that the occupation of Bosnia-Herzegovina was Just a beginning of its
union with the Monarchy by including it I11to Croatia-Slavonia The
"scientific" grounds for the Croatian pretensions to Bosma were laid by
the historian Tadija Smiciklas in Povijcst Hrvatska ("The History of
Croatia", Zagreb 1878), and his example was followed by Vjekoslav
Klaic in Atlas za hrvatsku povjesnicu ("The Atlas for Croatian His-
tory", Zagreb 1882). The French consul in Sarajevo L.Moreau re-
ported 111 summer 1883, recalling his preVIOUS despatch from Cetmje
"The aspiration to manage Bosma and Herzegovina m conformity with
the Croatian idea is not a new concept. It has existed for at least ten
years during the first years of the occupation [...] Certain plans are
known which deal with the forming of a new state [Bosnia-Herze-
govina with Croatia-Slavonia under Habsburgs] that would extend to-
wards the southeast [...] but the fact should not be ignored that this
plan will be impossible to realize as long as there is a single Serb left
[ ... ]." 10
The Hunganan nobleman Benjamin Kallay, Common Minister of
Finance, an expert for Serbian affairs and formerly a consul in Bel-
grade (1868-1875), was appointed administrator of Bosnia-Herze-
gOV1l1a m 1882. During his consulship in Belgrade, Kallay noticed that
<} M. Ekmecic, Ustanak II l Iercegovini i istorijske pouke . Prilozi XVIII, No 14.
Sarajevo 19R2, pp. 32-35
1() Ministcre des Affaire Etrangeres (MAE.), Paris, Correspondance politique ct
consulaire. Turquie-Sarajevo. vol. 13, 1'. 47X. Sarajevo. 20. juillet 1R83.
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"the strongest attraction exists between Serbia and Bosnia. Serbia IS
the only country with which the Christians of Bosnia would urute, and
under whose rule even the Muslims of Slavic origin from Bosnia
would feel contented (provided freedom of religion is granted to
them)." 11 His suggestions to back up the pretentions of Serbia to Bos-
111 a-Herzegovina, however, were met with reproach by Vienna. As the
occupation of Bosnia-Herzegovina was getting nearer, Kallay prepared
a memorandum (April 10, 1877) about the future Austro-Hungarian
administration. He predicted that the conflict between Islam and Chris-
tianity would be of great interest for the future government, and sug-
gested that the Muslims should be used as a barrier against the
Pan-Slavic tendencies. He therefore suggested that, by opposing the
Serbian national movement, Austria-Hungary should support a rap-
prochement of Muslims and Roman Catholics; his suggestion was in-
cluded in the instructions given to the new authorities after the
occupation. 12
In order to finally isolate Bosnia-Herzegovina from Serbia, Kal-
lay, influenced by the Hungarian concept of "political nation", care-
fully developed the idea of a separate "Bosnian nation". The bearers of
the new identity were to be the BOSnIan Muslims, the alleged medieval
Bogomil nobility who had retained their pnvileges by convertmg to Is-
lam. In spite of great efforts and systematic propaganda in the political,
cultural and educational spheres, the new ideology proclaimed by Kal-
lay did not meet the expected response. The entire theory was a far cry
from being historically founded: the majority of Bosnian nobility had
ceased to exist after the Ottoman conquests, and the Muslims were
mainly descendants of the Islarnized Serbs or Croats (each Musli m
family knows its origins). Kallay's ideology intended for Bosnia was
SImilar to the one practiced upon the Albanians: the Austrian scholars
tried to prove that all three religions in Albania were bound by a com-
mon orrgm, as the descendants of the ancient Illyrians.
Kallay believed that the ideology of a Bosnian nation would be
accepted by the Roman Catholics, whose national consciousness was
l l Haus, Hot' und Staatsarchiv, Wien. Politisches Archiv, Berichtc und Wiesungen.
K 177. No 63. :; 10.] P,6X~ Cf A. Radenic, "Planovl Austro-Ugarskc prcma Srbiii
u vezi sa aneksiicrn Bosnc i lIercegovine", Jugoslovenski narodi pred Prvi svetski
rot. SJ\NU. Pos izdanja, kn] CDXVI. Odelienie drustvenih. nauka, knj 61.
Beograd I%i. Ii 791." . . .
12 V. POPO'.IC. "Kalajeva ideja 0 pokatolicavonju bosanskih muslimana". Politika.
. Uskrsnj i b[01' (The Christmas issue 1. Beograd] 94().
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not formed yet. Antun Radic, the brother of Stjepan Radic who was to
become leader of the Croatian Peasant Party iHrvatska seljacka
strankas, wrote after his travels through Bosnia in 1899, that he was
"in many places sufficiently and unintentionaly convmced that the
Croatian name was utterly unknown to the peasants of Bosnia and Her-
zegovina." 13 On the other hand, travel-writings prior to the 1878 occu-
pation indicate that neither was the national identity of the Muslims
clearly profiled m a modem sense, except for an Identification with the
Ottomans. Johann Roskiewicz wrote in 1868 that "the Muslims on the
one side, and the Catholics and Greeks [i.e. the Orthodox Serbs] on the
other, are sharply divided from one another in all respects", and that in
the course of time the Bosnian Muslims completely abandoned the
unity with their co-nationals and called themselves "the real Turks" 14
Karl Grubler recorded in 1877 that the Bosnian Muslim "is not merelv
a Muslim, he is a Turk". L'i Adolph Strausz emphasized in 1882 that
"each gesture, each word, each thought" of the Bosnian Muslim is
closely connected with his religion. Although they hold in them their
Slavic character, in their religious feeling they "surpass by far all the
Islamic nations". Although not lacking tradition, the name Bosnjak
(Bosnian), however, referred solely to the Muslims: according to a
Croatian testimony "in Bosnia the Christians must not call themselves
Bosnjaks; when one says 'Bosnjak ', the Muslims consider themselves
only, while the Christians are the Bosnian raya or otherwise Vlachs".]()
In order to isolate Bosnia-Herzegovina from Serbia and Montenegro
Kallay's administration introduced differents measures, rangmg from eco-
nomic to military ones. Imports from Serbia m the early 1880's amounted
to 7,536,028 dinars, and exports to Serbia - 742,017 dinars. In 1885 im-
ports from Serbia dropped to 220,162, and exports - to 48,516 dinars. This
trend was maintained m the followmg decades. The trade with Montene-
gro bemg unsignificant, Kallay assessed that the ethnic and cultural rela-
tions between Herzegovinians and Montenegnns should be cut off by the
erection of military fortifications along the border. 17
13 "Bosanska vila". No 14, July 3 L Sarajevo 1900, p. 197.
14 J. Roskiewicz. Studien uber Bosnien lind die Herzegowina, Leipzig-Wien 1868.
pp 77-78. Roskiewicz was an intelligence officer 111 the Austrian consulate 111
Sarajevo
15 C. Grubler. Mohhammedanismus, Panslavismus lind Byzantinismus. Leipzig
1877, p. 62.
1() A. Strausz, Bosnien. Land lind Leute, vol. L Wicn 1882, p. 183.
17 Cf T. Kraljacic, Kalajev rezim II Bosni i Hercegovini 1882-1903, Sarajevo 1987,
pp. 99-103. 125-126
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From t 889 on, the administration introduced into Bosnia-Herze-
govina a special red and yellow flag, and coat-of-arms, trying to shape
the state symbols of both provinces. The officials (58 percent) were
brought from other parts of Monarchy as police officers (in the begin-
ning from Croatia-Slavonia mainly). Into the Serb-inhabited towns
along the Dnna river, Roman Catholics were settled, so that the Ser-
bian ethnic continuity would be interrupted along the Bosman border
with Serbia. The Jesuits were brought to Bosma in 1881 to strengthen
the Roman Catholic influence: they were considered as more militant
in their proselytism than the local Franciscans, whose co-operation
with the local Serbs and the authorities in Serbia had developed almost
harmoniously in previous decades. The Archbishop of Vrhbosna in
Sarajevo Josip Stadtler (from 1882) was prominent in arousing discord
between Orthodox Serbs and Roman Catholic Croats, and then be-
tween Serbs and Muslims. Despite formal wammgs from the authori-
ties, Stadtler did not hesitate to christianize the Muslims, arousing their
discontent and the first attempts at political-religious organization. Ro-
man Catholics also published several books bearing titles offensive to
the Orthodox Serbs, 18 and the persecutions based on national and relig-
ious motives often came close to overt racism.
The "Bosnian" language was declared as the official language in-
stead of the Serbo-Croatian, the Cyrillic alphabet was systematically
suppressed, and the Serbian schools, the most numerous, were gravely
disturbed in their work. Schools were considered important aids m
propagating the new Ideology. Kallay's ideas were expounded m heav-
ily subsidized papers, aimed at mducing Bosnian separatism (Sara-
jevski list, the official Die Bosnischc Post, the Muslim Bosnjakv; the
importation of the Serbian and partially Croatian newspapers from
Montenegro, Vojvcdina, Dalmatia and Serbia was forbidden. Kallay
even forbade his own book The History ofthe Serbian People - accord-
ing to his new criteria, he had written too affirmatively about the
Serbs, with knowledge and understanding. The policy of banning
newspapers and magazines remained in force even after Kallay's death
in 1903: the number of banned newspapers reached 187 in 1908 19 Out
of this number 134 were published in Belgrade, three in Novi Sad,
three in Sabac, two m Nis. and one each in Split, Kragujevac, Dub-
rovnik, Zadar. Sombor etc.
IS C]. Balan. Katolicka crkva i Sloven! II Bugarskoj, Srbiji, Bosni i Hercegovini .
Sarajevo 1885.
19 Arhiv BiH. Sarajevo, Fond Zem;11js':e vlade. No 1«2.7. rcs!l9Q8.
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Along with the persecutions of the Serbian national movement,
suppression of Serbian Orthodoxy was carried out. Under the conven-
tion signed with the Ecumenical Patriarchate in Constantinople in
March 1880, the occupying authorities were given the right to ordain
new metropolitans, while the existing four retained their sees. Three
metropolitans soon got expelled, and were quickly followed by the
fourth, Sava Kosanovic. In 1881 the Metropolitan of Sarajevo Sava
Kosanovic had informed the Serbian government, the Russian Synod
and the Ministry in Vienna that a local officer, a certain Graf Christof
von Mierszowicze, offered him a large sum of money to accept the Un-
ion with Rome, and to recognize the pope as the supreme religious
authority. A great scandal broke out. Kosanovic submitted a complamt
to Vienna agamst the "aggressive Roman Catholicism". and Graf
Mierszowicze had to be moved from Bosma. Kosanovic entered into a
dispute with the local government (Zemaljska vlada) in 1883, in which
he emphasized that he was bound by hIS vows to "educate his subordi-
nates and the people to cherish their religion and to respect the religion
of others [... ] I spread peace, love and harmony and rightfully expected
the others to act m the same tolerant and friendly way" Because of his
overt resistance to the Roman Catholic proselytism Kosanovic came
into conflict with Kallay and was forced m 1885 to resign and leave
Bosnia for good. The new Orthodox bishops, elected among the hierar-
chy of the Serbian Orthodox Church in Croatia and Vojvodina, were
expected to be loyal to the new authorities. The new bishops, however,
could not completely control the lower clergy, loyal only to their relig-
ious and national cause.
The sole institutions of the Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina, besides
the Church itself, were the communes of religious and educational
character. By the end of the 19th century there were 351 of them, but
only 42 were active. Some 309 schools under the administration of the
local Orthodox priests and teachers were active too. For the Serbs un-
der the foreign rule such communes were a kind of a state within the
state. Their work was restricted right after the occupation in 1878: the
Serbian requests for the free election of the Orthodox bishops, the use
of the Cyrillic alphabet, and the establishment of schools were then an-
swered by repressive measures, arrests and dismissals of school profes-
sors, as well as frequent raids on the communes. The Austro-Hungarian
authorities systematically disturbed or limited the schooling activities,
interfered in the affairs of the Episcopate, Consistory and School of
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Theology. and denied the financial means to the schools. teachers and
pnests. The Introduction of the Latin alphabet and Croatian dialect of
Serbo-Croatian into the Serbian schools aroused great resentment.
Latin alphabet was seen by the Serbs as "the essential feature of the
Catholicism" and the Croatian dialect as "concealed Catholic propa-
ganda".2o
The complaint of the Serbs from Banja Luka. submitted in 1882,
is a good illustration of such feelings: "The judicial and administrative
officials who came to this country [ ] have had no other business but
to spread 'Greater Croatian ideas' [ ] as if there were no Serbs in this
country. The Cyrillic alphabet is neglected and despised, and the
'Croatian Latin' alphabet IS forced upon the people as the official one,
though the majority of the Bosnian population does not understand it
and cannot read it [...] Besides the alphabet, our Serbian nationality is
also despised and oppressed, especially by minor officials. The offi-
cials mainly came to us from Croatia and gladly engaged themselves in
spreading 'Greater Croatian' ideas among us, the Serbs. instead of ful-
filling their duties diligently.v-! In 1880, a similar memorandum by the
Serbs from Mostar was sent to the RUSSIan Emperor, the traditional
protector of the Orthodox Christians in the Ottoman Empire. The Serbs
from Mostar were complaining about the suppression of the Cyrillic al-
phabet and Serbian national rights as well as about police repression.
The National Movement (J896-1905)
Since 1896, with the intellectual support of Serbs from Croatia,
Dalmatia and Vojvodina and the government In Belgrade, the move-
ment of the Bosnian Serbs for the educational and religious autonomy
grew. The Serbs, led by GligoriJe Jeftanovic, Vojislav Sola, Stjepo
Trifkovic and Kosta Kujundzic, submitted three memorandums to the
Emperor Franz Joseph (1896, 1897, 190 I) demanding religous and
communal autonomy, CIvil rights, freedom of the press, freedom of
gathering, and constitutional protection.P
Their position IS well-illustrated by the first Memorandum of No-
vember 5, 1895, signed by the representatives of all major Serbian
20 The report of the Russian consul from Sarajevo of November 12, 1880, quoted in:
Istorija srpskog naroda. vol. VI-I, Beograd 1983, pr. 612-613. (M Ekmacic)
2 J Istorija srpskog narodii. vol VI-', p. 613-614 (M. Ekmccic)
22 CJ B. Madzar. Pokret Srba Bosne i Hercegovina za vjersko-prosvjetnu
autonomiju; Sarajevo 1<)82, pr. 263-274.
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communes (Sarajevo, Mostar, Tuzla, Zvornik, Brcko, Gracanica, Sto-
lac, Doboj, Bosanska Gradiska, Prijedor. Bosanski Nevi, Dubica, San-
ski Most, and Bijeljina): "Non-Orthodox commissaries attend our
meetings and take part in decision-making; they take down by force
the sacred icons and historic pictures: they forbid the purchase and
transfer of real estate to the religious and educational communes, with-
out prior permission from the political authorities: they disturb relig-
ious rites, they VIOlate and change the ceremony of Samt Sava feast:
they do not obey the orders concerning the usage of the Cyrillic alpha-
bet In the communes, but Impose the Latin alphabet and Croatisms;
they negate the use of the Serbian name and impose by force to the
communes the name of the Bosman language (especially in printed
matter for school reports); they forbid the free election of parsons, they
chase away and move the priests; they impose fines on the members of
the communes and persecute them: the Serbian churches cannot be
erected in honorable places, but in less promment ones or even out of
the towns; the make-up of church chorus to embellish the liturgy IS not
permitted (i.e. In Bosanski Novi, Bosanska Gradiska, Brcko): the ac-
ceptance of donations and gifts is hampered by the need to obtain po-
litical permission; the churches of our Serbian Orthodox communes
are managed according to the laws for corporations or political socie-
ties, a fact opposed to the canon law; m certain communes, without the
consent by the people and the clergy, by-laws are imposed that contra-
dict the regulations of the Orthodox Church and place all the power
Into the hands of the police."n
Repression over the signatones of the Memorandum followed -
interference In their affairs up to the "legal" confiscation of their work-
shops, licences and estates - and the Serbian merchants were com-
pelled to sign a petition against the Memorandum renouncing its
initiative. The Serbian leaders were thus divided into two factions: the
larger, so-called "people's", and the minor group of "government's
men". The adjournment of the Serbian commune of Sarajevo In Febru-
ary 1897 was carried out by a visible police repression, and similar ac-
tions followed in the other towns: a member of the Serbian communal
assembly from Bosanski Novi was condemned to three years of hard
labour because he did not invest his authority to prevent local Serbs
23 Quoted in: P. Slijepccvic (ed.), Naper Bosne i Hercegovine za oslobodjenje i
ujedinjenje, Sarajevo 1929, pp. 82-83.
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from going to Orthodox church. He was acquitted by the Supreme
Court, but only after a number of petitions.
The second Memorandum to the Emperor (March 1897), which
had the support of the Muslims too, was followed by persecutions, dis-
missals and the resignation of twelve Serbian teachers. Kallay made
special efforts, through some clergymen who were loyal to him, to im-
plement the laws that would practically suspend religious and educa-
tional autonomy of the Serbs.
After the third Memorandum (May 1900) the protection and inter-
vention of Russia was asked for. In a letter to Pobedonostsev, the rep-
resentative of the Russian Synod, it was emphasized: "It is almost ten
years now that we have been struggling with all of our force for the
autonomy of the Church and the national schooling, rights we were en-
titled to even under the Turks, and the battle is not over yet. The peo-
ple are losing hope that we might succeed in our actions, if we are not
aided by someone stronger and mightier. Our only hope is the help
from mighty and brotherly Russia. "24 It was only after the fourth
Memorandum (June 5, 1902) that the Austro-Hungarian authorithies
accepted to negotiate the new conditions for Serbian communal and
ecclesiastic autonomy.
The favoritism enjoyed by the Roman Catholic Church was no-
ticed by several foreign travelers: "Complaints are heard that the ad-
ministration encouraged the settling of the citizens from the Monarchy
and thus attempted to change the ratio of the population. It is true that
the number of Catholics, a mere 209.391 in 1879, reached 334.112 in
1895, which makes 30 percent of the increase In this period, while the
Catholics made only 18 percent of the population in 1879. Trying to be
utterly objective as to the development of the Roman Church in Bos-
nia, which is one of the points especially insisted upon by the Serbs, I
have to state that the number of Catholic churches, vastly encreased af·
ter the occupation, is no doubt higher than the population of that faith
needs [...] At the moment of occupation there were only 35 Catholic
churches; from 1878 to 1906 another 153 were built, while to the num-
ber of235 Orthodox churches in 1878, only 201 new ones were added.
In short, if it IS impossible to speak about a Germanization of Bosnia, it
cannot be denied that the government desi res, to a certain extent, the
Croatization of the country, and consequently its stronger link to the
Monarchy and promotion of a plan certainly w0I1h of attention [.. ] A
24 Ibid.. p. 88.
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senous criticism concerns the fact that in the administration of the
country almost exclusively officers of the Austrian or Hungarian origin
are employed. A young, very educated man from an esteemed Sara-
jevo family [...] complained strongly about such an exclusiveness: all
the administrative posts are held by foreigners, the major part of
whom, it is true, are the Slavs, Czechs or even Croats: but, in his
words, they are more Austrian than the Germans themselves. "25
Albert Maler, well-acquainted with the situation m the Balkans,
wrote In a Parisian magazine Revue Blcue. "Austna has made no effort
to calm down religious rivalries. Making use of the fact that it IS the
fervent faith that the nationality originates from, Austria tends to di-
vide the Serbian nation in Bosnia into three nationalities. To the Mus-
lims It says: 'You are not Serbs, but Bosnians; your language is not
Serbian, but Bosnian; you have your history and your laws which have
nothing in common with the Christian history and laws.' To the Catho-
lics, it tells they are Croats. They are rather glad to listen to it, because
they enjoy all the benefits. Orthodox Serbs are the only allowed to call
themselves Serbs and to speak Serbian. In order to clearly delineate
these national distinctions, Austna has started numerous magazines.
These are subsidized by Austria, and edited by the police: Bosnjak
[The Bosnian] for the Muslims, and Glas Hercegovaca [The Voice of
Herzegoviniansi for the Catholics. "26
Numerous anonymous reports coming from the Serbs of Bosnia
were published in the Belgrade press, denouncing Kallay's nationali-
ties policy. One of these reports stressed that Kallay's administration
tried to present his rule to the foreign press as enlightened and modern:
"In order to justify his acts of obstruction and harassment of our
schools, Kallay, through a part of the European press. makes our peo-
ple appear blinded by the Greater Serbian propaganda and unable to
see the real thruth: he depicts our [Serbian] people as barbarians insen-
sitive to any European culture and progress [...] How far-fetched and
how untruthfully the foreign travellers write about our position in Bos-
nia [...] let us mention [...] Houston Stewart Chamberlain who, in his
essay La Bosnie SOliS Ie protectorat de I 'Autrichc. published by 'La
bibliotheque universelle' in 1892 (vol.14 April-May) speaking about
25 L. Lamuch, La Bosnie afa veille et au lendemain de f 'annexion. Angers 1911. pp.
16-20.
26 Quoted from the Serbian translation: Albert Male. Bosna I Hercegovina. Delo vol.
XIV. 1897. Beograd. p. 339
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and commending the administration of Bosnia-Herzegovina said:
'Serbs vainly believe that the Latin alphabet is an act of the devil, and
will not have their children learn it.' What savages he makes us appear,
and I suppose only because we object against the communal schools
where the main alphabet is Latin. It is true that we oppose their forc-
ibly imposing Latin upon us. [...] We love what is our own [Cyrillic al-
phabet], and respect that which belongs to the others. ,,27
The Bosnian Serbs established co-operation with the autonomist
Muslim movement, both having been confronted with the threat ofRo-
man Catholic proselytism. In 1902 the important cultural society of the
Serbs was founded in Sarajevo - "Prosvjeta" which, along with "Zora"
from Mostar, was the cornerstone of the future struggle for national
rights. In 1910, out of710 cultural societies, as much as 396 were Ser-
bian. Among the others, the Muslim society "Gajret" was also rather
important and considered as being pro-Serbian. The political agree-
ment between the Serbian and Muslim leaderships reached in Slavon-
27 "Politicko-prosvetne prilike u Bosni i Hercegovini", De/a, vol. XVI, Belgrade
1897, pp. 530-531. Another Bosnian Serb recorded that he was given the
following reply when he introduced himself as the Orthodox Serb to an
ober-lieutenant of the Austro-Hungarian army: "What Serb! We shall not shed our
blood in this country for you to call yourselves the Serbs, never! The only Serbs
are those that are born in Serbia." Describing the Austro-Hungarian policy of
de-Serbization, an anonymous Bosnian Serb emphasized: "We will not and cannot
contemplate here the reasons and political calculations which made the
Austro-Hungarian Monarchy use all the means right from the start in order to
force a nation to renounce its name, its nationality, to force us to renounce the
Serbdom, our Serbian name and nationality [...] Were these measures in the best
interest of the European civilization and progress? Is it the renouncement of one's
own nationality that the highly praised European civilization imposes to a nation
as a condition for becoming civilized? It is those who signed the mandate given to
Austria-Hungary to occupy Bosnia-Herzegovina that are obliged to answer these
questions." Describing the methods of Kallay's rule, he added: "The competence
of the Serbian Orthodox communes was gradually reduced, some of their
activities being put under the control of the state. The government started the
newspapers 'Bosnjak' [The Bosnian] with the purpose of propagating the alleged
'Bosnian' nationality. Some of the members of the communes were deliberately
persecuted and fmancially ruined by the government, whereas the others were
favoured in order to excite envy among them. As the members of the city
communes were mostly tradesmen, and the trade being exclusively in the hands of
our tradesmen, systematic efforts were made to take over the trading business and
confer it upon the foreigners. [...] in order to keep our nation in the dark and
deprived of any spiritual nourishment, not only the Serbian newspapers were
banned, but the books as well, and those which were spared were looked upon
with an evil eye, whereas the books issued by the [Rome-seated Croatian] 'Sv.
Jeronim' ['Society of St. Hieronimus'] and 'Matica Hrvatska'['The Croatian
matrix'] were forcibly imposed upon us." (Ibid., pp. 513-514).
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ski Brod in 1902 was envisaged as an attempt at overcoming religious
differences between the Serbs of Orthodox and the Muslim faith. Their
joint struggle for the autonomy of Bosnia and Herzegovina as Serbian
lands was then agreed upon the following issues: "The Serbs of the Or-
thodox and Muslim faith pledge to act and to call upon the people to
act III order that Bosnia and Herzegovina may gain the autonomy un-
der the supreme power of the Sultan"; it was agreed that "the public
and official language is Serbian, and the alphabet is Cyrillic."28 Ac-
cording to this agreement Bosnia-Herzegovina should be administrated
by a Muslim and an Orthodox governor in turns, and that all the Ro-
man Catholic orders with the exception the Franciscans should be ex-
pelled. In spite of a series of obstructions and persecutions, the Serbian
autonomist movement obtained in August 1905, two years after Kal-
lay's death, the religious and educational autonomy, sought for
throughout the previous decades. The plan of creating the separate
"Bosnian nation" was thus definitively abandoned. Instead of being
named as "Bosnian" or "zemaljski" (meaning: "of the land"), the lan-
guage was officially named Serbo-Croatian in 1907, despite the at-
tempts to change it into Croato-Serbian.
The new administrator of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Stefan von
Burian (1903-1911), tried to calm down the conflicts between the
authorities and the Serbs by moderating the attitude towards their na-
tional rights and the religious emancipation of the Muslims, but the re-
sults were modest. 29
Kallay's policy of forcibly imposing the new Bosnian identity did
not yield the desired results, but provoked a counter-effect. The French
consul in Sarajevo noticed that "to refine the means of oppression does
not mean to civilize'L'" The Bosnian Serbs, even without the aid from
Belgrade, became more organized and felt stronger solidarity, so they
used the new circumstances to establish closer ties with the Serbs in
Vojvodina and, to some extent, in Croatia-Slavonia. According to a
German interpretation: 'The outskirts of Austria became porous. Bos-
nia, designed to become a barrier against Serbia, became instead the
area through which the Serbdom penetrated. Kallay himself admitted
the failure of his Bosnian policy and gradually changed it, but it was
28 V. Skaric, O. Hadzi Nuric, N. Stojanovic, op.cit. p. 96.
29 On development of the Muslim movement cf R. Donia, Islam Under the Double
Eagle. The Muslims ofBosnia-Herzegovina 1878-1914, Boulder Colorado 1981.
30 The report from Sarajevo of January 24, 1897. quoted in: Istorija srpskog naroda,
vol. VI-1, Beograd 1983, p. 622.
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too late - he died in 1903. One of his last statements was: 'Le serbisme,
voila l'ennemi'. "31
The unsolved agrarian question was an additional source of the
Serbian discontent. The 1859 edict issued by the Ottoman authorities
had been adopted by the Austro-Hungarian administration as a valid
legal act. Though stating equal protection of rights for both landowners
and serfs, the authorities of occupation actually preserved the Ottoman
feudal system. The legislation favoured landowners, the Muslims, and
discriminated against the serfs, mostly Serbs.F
According to the 1910 census, out of the total number of 10,430
landowners with serfs, 9,537 were Muslims. Out of 79,667 serfs,
58,895 were the Orthodox Serbs. These discriminatory measures were
then incorporated into the new legal acts. By the order of January 9,
1883, the repartition of the serfs' farmsteads was forbidden unless the
landowner permitted it. Another order (July 19, 1891) specified that
the houses and buildings erected by the serfs were not their own prop-
erty, but the possession of landowners who were to provide a compen-
sation. By the third order (December 8, 1895) the agrarian lawsuits
came within the competence of the administration which was protec-
tive towards the landowners. For the right of repartition the serfs were
compelled to compensate the landowners in the form of a considerable
,gift'. In order to prevent revolts, the administration was giving loans
to the serfs to buy their properties since 1884. The results, however,
were poor because the serfs were under great obligations both to the
state and the Muslim landowners. Unable to pay dues, many serfs lost
their estates and were ruined. This was the reason that a true small-
scale war was waged between the Serbian serfs and the Muslim land-
owners. In 1896 the number of agrarian lawsuits was as high as
133.423, and by 1904 it rose to more than 200.000.33 Peasant uprisings
of 1910, to which the reaction was collective fines for setting land-
owners houses on fire, were partially overcome by the Emperor's law
of voluntary redemption (June 13, 1911).34
All the repressive measures against the Serbs proved to be insuffi-
cient. The Serbs dominated Bosnia and Herzegovina not only by
demographic growth (being mostly a rural population, they had the
31 E. Anrich, Die jugoslawische frage J870-1914, Stuttgart 1931, p. 48.
32 T. Kraljacic, op. cit. , pp. 503-506.
33 H. Kapidzic, "Agramo pitanje u Bosni i Hercegovini za vrijeme austruugarskc
vladavine", in: Jugoslovenski narodi pred Prvi svetski rat, pp. 331-335.
34 T. Kraljacic, lac. ·cit.
134 Dusan T. Batakovic
highest birth rate), but also in economic strenght. Although the town
were predominantly Muslim-inhabited, the entreprising layer of mer-
chants, under the constrained circumstances, was made up mostly of
Serbs. One of the wisest Austrian statesmen, Dr. J. M. Baemreither,
came to the conclusion that the Bosnian Serbs were "the richest, the
most vigorous and the most capable for business in Bosnia and Herze-
govina'i"
The development of banking institutions clearly showed the rise
of Serbian economy. The first Serbian monetary institution was
founded III Mostar (Serbian bank-Srpska banka), and it was followed
by the Serbian Credit Fund (Srpski kreditni zavod) in Banja Luka in
1905, the Serbian Commercial Bank (Srpska trgovinska banka) in
Brcko, Serbian Savings-Bank (Srpska stedionicai in Prijedor. The next
year, Serbian savings-banks were opened in Bijeljina and Livno; the
Serbian Credit Bank and Savings-Bank in Tuzla and the Serbian Credit
Fund (Srpski kreditni zavod) in Bosanska Gradiska were founded in
1907, a Serbian savings-bank was opened in Bosanska Dubica in 1908,
a Serbian Bank and savings-bank in Trebinje in 1910, another six
banks in 1911, and finally the Serbian Central Bank was set up in
Sarajevo in 1912.36
Although the prevailing majority of the Serbs in Bosnia was the
agrarian population, by the beginning of the 20th century 17 out of 19
millionaires in Sarajevo were Serbs. According to the census of 1910,
there were 1.898.044 inhabitants; out of this number, 825.418 were Or-
thodox, 612.137 Muslims and 434.061 Catholics (mainly Croats, but
also Czechs, Poles and Germans). The number of Muslims kept de-
creasing due to low birth rate and constant emigration to Turkey. The
authorities feared that the Orthodox Serbs would gradually gain domi-
nance in Bosnia, so they kept settling a new Roman Catholic popula-
tion for the needs of their economy, bureaucracy and police apparatus.
In 1910 there were 124.591 persons without Bosnian citizenship, and
by 1914 some 180.000 people had been settled there. About 140.000
persons, exclusively Serbs and local Muslims, were compelled to emi-
grate under pressure, economic or political, to Serbia or Turkey.V
35 J. M. Baernreither, Fragmente eines politischen Tagebuches. Die Sudslawische
Frage und Osterreich-Ungarn vor dem Weltkrieg, Berlin 1928. Quoted in: N.
Stojanovic, Bosanska kriza 1908-1914, Sarajevo 1958, p. 21.
36 "Pregled", vol XIV (3,1912), March 15, Sarajevo 1912, p.l38.
37 All statistical data are quoted from: Dj. Pejanovic, Stanovnistvo Bosne i
Hercegovine, Beograd 1955.
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In Austria-Hungary, Bosnia-Herzegovina had a status similar to
that of a colony. The development of the occupied provinces was not
much worked on: the efforts were aimed at exploiting the resources;
roads and railroads were built, so that the raw materials from the mines
and forests could be easily transported to their final destination. The
agrarian question was unsolved, and only 14,33 percent of the children
were incl uded into the educational system as late as 1908. In his story
"Jazavac pred sudom" ('A Badger before the Court', 1903) agrarian
leader and famous writer Petar Kocic ridiculed the authorities and
through the character of a seemingly naive peasant denied that Franz
Joseph was his emperor; he wondered if "at least an average emperor
may be carved out of the Serbian king or the Montenegrin prince, since
we, the Serbs, have felt like having an emperor for a long time."
The discontent with the Austro-Hungarian administration was
well understood by count Agenor von Goluchowski, the Minister of
Foreign Affairs of the Monarchy, who gloomily concluded in 1903: "In
spite of the efforts of Mr Kallay and his engaged optimism, no one in
this country hides the fact that the Austrian influence has not made a
single step forward in the occupied provinces and that [Austria-Hun-
gary] has not gained any popularity. "38 The officials brought to Bos- .
nia-Herzegovina often had unsufficient training, as they originated
mainly from the lower military echelons, With inadequate or none
whatsoever knowledge of the language, the foreign officials acted
rudely and arrogantly, thus mducing great agitation and constant ani-
mosity, In 1904, 34,5 percent of the officials m Bosnia-Herzegovina
had come from Austria, 38,29 percent from Hungary, and solely 26,48
percent were natives, mainly Croats. In 1907, among 32,22 percent of
officials of domestic origin, 61,6 percent were Roman Catholics, 29,94
percent were Orthodox and only 8,6 percent Muslims. The authorities
and the subjects were on stiff and strictly official terms. The natives of
all the three national groups were usually considered by the officials
from Hungarian or Austrian parts of the Monarchy as dummer Bos-
niak. Iso Krsnjavi, a Croatian politician, recorded that the dissatisfac-
tion of the Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina, which could be described as
"commotion", should not be interpreted only as the result of political
agitation from Serbia: "To a much greater extent it is the consequence
of the errors committed in Austria-Hungary.":'?
38 Documents diplomatiques francais, 2c serie, vol. IlL Paris 1911, p. 85.
39 "Osterreichische Rundschau". Wicn, vol. XIII. 1907, p. 199.
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On the occasion of the first relatively free local elections, both
Serbs and Muslims unfurled the same slogan against the foreigners;
"Fuori 10 straniero!" was the cry which, as in the times of Mazzini in
Italy, united the two groups. Only the Croatian clericals in Bosnia
showed enthusiasm for the Monarchy. Gathered around the Arch-
bishop of Sarajevo, Stadtler. they argued in a number of articles pub-
lished in 1906-1907 in the newspapers Hrvatski dnevnik (The Croatian
Daily) that, after the annexation, Bosnia and Herzegovina should be
united with Croatial'' After the enactment of a somewhat more liberal
law on the freedom of the press (1907). the Serbian papers, trying to
aVOId the accusations for their connection with Serbia, argued for
autonomy as a possible solution for Bosnia-Herzegovina, and pru-
dently accepted the terminology of the Muslim papers referring to the
Emperor in Vienna as "the provisional mandatary of the European
powers to admmistrate Bosnia and Herzegovina". and emphasizing
that both provinces were constitutive parts of the Ottoman Empire.
The Serbian political body was divided in three factions. The
elder generation of the Serbian moderate politicians in Bosnia, gath-
ered around the papers Srpska rijec (Serbian Word) in Sarajevo
(founded in 1905).The younger generation, mostly the former Vienna
students, gathered around the strictly national papers Otadzbina (Fa-
therland) from Banja Luka (founded in 1907) and Narod (Nation) from
Mostar (founded also in 1907), which wrote about Austria-Hungary as
the "neighboring Monarchy". Until a faction from Banja Luka strongly
emphesized the social problems of the peasants, Narod cherished the
national and cultural elevation.
The Bosnian Serbs tried to organize their struggle for national
rights similarly to the other Slavic peoples within the Monarchy -
through the press, political parties and organizations and, very limit-
edly, through the Parliament (the Bosnian Assembly, promised in
1908, began to work as late as 1910, but because the narrow franchise
it could not truly reflect the political situation). In the first article of the
programme of the Serbian National Organization (Srpska Narodna Or-
ganizacija, 1907), whose leaders were elected by the general vote, it
was emphasized as the basic principle that "every nation has its right to
self-determination11. 41
40 "Hrvatski dnevnik" No 168 (1906). Sarajevo; No 147 (1907) Cf. V.Corovlc.
Odnosi izmedju Srbije i Austro-Ugarske u ./0\' veku, pp.188-190.
41 "1 Basic principles: Each nation has the right of self-determination. In the state the
will of the people must be considered as the source of authority. The main condition
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The cultural initiatives of the Monarchy - from the foundation of
cultural institutions with prominently Bosnian, regional character, to
the starting of the new scientific reviews and the publishing of strik-
ingly luxurious volumes in which the historical, philological and liter-
ary independence of Bosnia- Herzegovina was glorified - were all
motivated by an ultimately political aim: to create a regional cultural
center as the counterweight to the increasing cultural influence from
Belgrade, with which the intelligentsia of the Bosnian Serbs estab-
lished close cooperation. Soon enough the Serbian papers uncovered
the political motive of such an orientation of the scientific institutions:
"The luxuriously furnished and illustrated volumes with the contents of
scientific value, the commissioned scientific excursions, the con-
gresses of scholars all over Glasinac and Ilidza, all these are the mani-
festations of the mercenary role imposed to science by the police. 1142
Austria-Hungary and Serbia: The Conflict Reopened (1903-1908)
The 1903 military coup brought to Serbia, along with the dynasty
of Karadjordjevic back to the throne, a new attitude in foreign affairs.
The period from 1903 to 1914 was marked by Serbia's return to the
policy laid out in the Nacertanije of Ilija Garasanin, but modified to
concur with the new circumstances in international relations: the acti-
vation of the struggle for the national unification through an inde-
pendent foreign policy. Reliance on the Western democracies, France
and Great Britain, as opposed to the growing German influence, was
managed through Russia, in which the Serbs saw a natural ally, tradi-
tional champion of Slavic and Orthodox interests in the Balkans. The
raising of the Serbian question in the south as well (the problem of the
forthcoming allocation of the Balkan provinces still under Ottoman
rule in Old Serbia and Macedonia), together with the solution to the
of progress of the state is the versatile growth of all ranks. The religious differences
do not impede whatsoever the union of the national interests. The culturally and
economically strong man is a precondition of a free man. and a free man is the sole
sound base of a tree state. n. State: Bosnia and Herzegovina are the constitutive part
of the Ottoman Empire, and Austria-Hungary governs it on baSIS of the mandate of
the European powers. HI. State organization: 1. The complete autonomy of Bosnia
and Herzegovina. 2. '11h~ exercise of the legislative and contol of power by a popular
representative expressed bv general, direct, equal and secret vote. The government is
the expression of the Parliament" (Bosna i Hercegovina pod austro-ugarskom
upravom, pp. 115-116).
42 "Srpska rijec", March 14 (27), Sarajevo 1908.
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further destiny of the Serbs and South Slavic peoples within the
Habsburg Empire, led to the overt conflict with Austria-Hungary.
The rivalry with die Monarchie, dual by the bearers of power and
multiethnic in its structure (47.100.000 inhabitants, compared to
2.600.000 Serbs in Serbia, and almost 7.000.000 Serbs, Croats and
Slovenes within the Monarchy), ran along several parallel planes, Bos-
nia-Herzegovina not being the primary issue in the beginning.
Political circles in Vienna planned to solve the growing rivalry
between the Austrian and Hungarian political elites by territorial ex-
pansion and the annexation of the adjacent Slavic states. Through an
increase of the Slavic population within the Empire, the new possibili-
ties for a tripartite structure of the state would emerge, in which the
struggle of the Hungarian and Slavic elites would Install supremacy of
the German part of the Empire - Austria.
For Vienna, a war in the Balkans - against Serbia - would mean
an internal purification and the first precondition of the internal con-
solidation of the Monarchy; it was referred to as a "cleaning with an
iron broom". For Austria-Hungary, which could not keep pace with the
economic growth of the other European powers, the strengthening of
national movements inside its borders was a twofold danger: firstly,
the possibility of the whole Empire falling apart, further diminishing
its Austrian and Hungarian territories, and secondly, the possibility of
a social revolution endangering the power of the domineering layer of
landed anstocracy. Becoming more and more dependent on Germany,
which in turn tended to make Austria its satellite, and at the same time
endangered by its ally, Italy, whose considerable minority lived within
the borders of the Habsburg state, Austria-Hungary was compelled to
solve the internal problems by further penetration into the Balkansf'
For Serbia, the process of gaining political and military inde-
pendence began, as advised from St. Petersburg, by commissioning
cannons for the army from the French firm "Schneider-Creusot", al-
though Austria-Hungary did it best to make its firm "Skoda" or the
German concern "Krupp" obtain the commission. The reply from Vi-
enna to the Serbian challenge was the five-year long customs tariff
conflict (1906-1911), known as the "Pig War". However, by using Sa-
lonika port for export, the Serbian economy successfully resisted the
Austrian blockade, although till then 66 percent of the import and 93
43 A. Mitrovic, Prodor na Balkan. Srbija u palnovima Austro-Ugarske i Nernacke
1908-1918, Beograd 1981, pp. 68-76.
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percent of the export had depended heavily on the Hungarian and Aus-
trian markets. A few years later only 41 percent of the Serbian trade
was controlled by the Monarchyf"
The Road to Annexation
The annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina on October 6, 1908,
its formal inclusion into Austria-Hungary on the occasion of the sixti-
eth anniversary of the reign of Franz Joseph, was preceded by elabo-
rate consultations within the military circles of the Monarchy;" As
early as 1907 the evaluation began in Vienna as to the future relations
with Serbia. In the summer of 1908 a plan was completed about the to-
tal destruction or Serbia as "the revolutionary nest" and the division of
its territory between the Monarchy and Bulgaria. The possible allot-
ment of territories to Romania and Albania (after its formation in
1912) was also considered. In Budapest it had been suspected for some
years (1908-1909, 1912, 1913, and in July 1914) that the intention of
Vienna to wage a war with Serbia was aimed at undermining the posi-
tion of Hungary in the Monarchy. For the Hungarian elite a better solu-
tion was the establishing of the protectorate over formally independent
but territorially diminished and politically neutralized Serbia. The
Young Turk revolution in July 1908 additionally accelerated the prepa-
rations for the annexation.
The annexation of Bosma-Herzegovina was the consequence of
the interior and exterior political needs of Austria-Hungary. The begin-
ning of the political collaboration between the Serbs and the Croats in
Croatia, Dalmatia and Slavonia (Croato-Serbian Coalition), the Ser-
bian national movement for the religious and educational autonomy in
Bosnia-Herzegovina, along with the analogous movement of the Bos-
nian Muslims. gave rise to fears that the further development of the
movement for the Serbian union might make the idea of Serbia as the
Piedmont appealing to the South Slavic peoples of the Monarchy.
Count Aehrenthal. the Austro-Hungarian Minister of Foreign Af-
fairs, explained to the German government, in the autumn of 1908. the
logics of the Vienna policy: "With the weakening of Turkey and its ex-
pulsion into ASia, the process of state rearrangment has begun agam on
44 D. Djordjevic. Carinski rat Austro-Ug.nske i Srbije IY06-19lJ. lstoriiski institut.
Beograd 1962,
45 Large diplomatic evaluation in :\t j\'i:l1Ch:Lh. La crise bosniaque (1908-1909) et
les puissances europeennes, 2 vols. Paris ]937
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our southeastem frontiers. As we had to resume the attitude towards
the fact, thirty years ago it was solved by the occupation. and this time
it is annexation. These two acts meant the destruction of the dream
about a Greater Serbian state between the Danube. Sava and the Adria-
tic. It need not be emphasized that this new factor, if it existed, would
be directed from the outside, from the northeast and west, and there-
fore would not be an element contributing to the peaceful develop-
ments in central Europe. In such a decisive phase of our state
reorganization which. from our point of VIew. should be more accu-
rately denoted as 'the development of the Reich', one must. if nothing
else helps, think about the implementation of the ultima ratio in the
life of a nation. "46 AehrenthaI left the plan about the war with Serbia.
thoroughly worked out in Vienna. for the next phase: the way to Salo-
nika led over conquered Serbia. The Mimster of Foreign Affairs of the
Monarchy planned to make Serbia harmless by war and to impose
upon it a high amount of war reparations - 500 million francs. While
Serbia would be paying the reparations for many years. the Monarchy
would retain the governing of Belgrade as a guarantee.
The Preparationsfor the Annexation: the Trialfor High Treason in
Zagreb
The public in the Monarchy was prepared for the annexation by a
fabricated trial in 1908-1909 in Zagreb. Fifty three Serbian politicians
were accused of conspiring against the Monarchy in collaboration with
the Belgrade government. In the spring of 1908, Aehrenthal ordered
the Croatian ban (local governor) Pavao Rauch to collect evidence
about the disloyal Serbs who would then be accused for high treason in
the right moment. The unavoidable nature of the forthcoming annexa-
non of Bosnia-Herzegovina was to be explained to European public by
the "evidence" for the anti-state propaganda waged by the Serbs and. if
needed, the Croats of Yugoslavist stance. For Croatia-Slavonia, it
meant a struggle against the Croato-Serb Coalition which. in spite of
the pressure exercised by the authorities, had gained victory one more
time, so that in March 1908 the ruler dismissed the Croatian Assembly
and imposed absol utism. The Croatian newspaper Ustavnost threat-
ened the Serbs that they might meet the same pogroms as before in Za-
46 Ostcrreich-Ungarns Aussenpoiitik von der bosnischen Krise 1908 bis zum
Kriegsausbruch 1914, vol. T, Wicn 1930. pp. 2-3
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greb in 1902, l.e. persecutions and executions. The target of all the at-
tacks was the Serbian Independent Party (Srpska samostalna stranka),
slandered for the alleged "Greater-Serbian propaganda". Firstly, in
1908 planted posters appeared in Kostajnica containing an appeal to
the Serbs to rise and offences to the imperial family. Before the
charges were brought, from August 1908 to the end of the year the ar-
rests of the Serbs took place, most commonly based on denouncina-
tions by different persons, such as Roman Catholic parish priests and
the followers of the Pure Party of Rights (Cista stranka prava) led by
Josip Frank. 47
When the annexation was publicly announced on October 7,
1908, the Zagreb prison became filled up with Serbs. The arrested
"traitors" were then spectacularly led in chains through Zagreb. The
accused were the leaders of the Serbian Independent Party, among
them Adam and Valerijan Pribicevic, brothers of Svetozar Pribicevic,
the leader of the Coalition. Among the traitors were 14 merchants, 12
teachers, 9 civil servants, 6 landowners, 5 priests, 3 craftsmen, 2 phYSI-
cians, one professor and one student. The trial in which 31 men were
convicted, was held immediately before the elections, in order to break
the Croato-Serb Coalition. The charges were based upon the statute of
a ephemere Serbian revolutionary organization which argued for a Yu-
goslav republic (and not a monarchy under the King Petar I Karadjord-
jevic as it was stated in the charges). The main "evidence" was drawn
from a brochure (pamphlet Finale) written by Djordje Nastic, an agent
of the Vienna government.t'' The organization "Slavic South" (Sloven-
skijug) from Belgrade was also accused. The charges were expected to
prove that there wer no Serbs (about 25 percent of the population) in
Croatia-Slavonia, and that their existence was amy the product of an
obstinate propaganda by the Serbian Orthodox Church and the nation-
alistic propaganda from Serbia.
The defendants were accused of proclaiming the Serbian name,
spreading the Cyrillic alphabet and bearing Serbian flags, of founding
banks, bearing the Serbian coat-of-arms, although none of this was ille-
gal. The theory of their alleged origins from the Vlachs was revived,
but it was persuasively refuted by the historians Radoslav Grujic from
Vojvodina and Ljubomir Kovacevic from Serbia.i? Many lawyers - 38
47 Arhiv Hrvatske, Zagreb, lrcdsednicki spisi Zemaljske vlade, 1908, fasc. 704.
48 G. Nastitsch, Finale, Buuapest 19u8.
49 R. M. Grujic, Apologija srpskog naroda u Hrvatskoj i Slavoniji, Novi Sad 1909:
Lj. Kovacevic, Srbi u Hrvatskoj i veletzdajnicka parnica 1909, Beograd 1909.
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in all - were willing to defend the defendants, among them 21 Croats,
mainly of Yugoslavist orientation. The Pribicevic brothers were de-
fended by a Croat Hinko Hinkovic, a member of the Parliament from
the Croato-Serbian Coalition. The Czech leader Thomas G. Masaryk
conducted a investigation in Zagreb and Belgrade on the statements In
the "indictment" and stood in defence of the accused. Masaryk re-
quired that the Austrian Parliament urgently investigate the allegations
about a revolutionary movement in the south of the Monarchy and sub-
mit a report. At the same time, he convincingly proved that some of
the documents were forged by the translator of the Austro-Hungarian
legation in Belgrade, who made heavy mistakes. 50 The Dalmatian As-
sembly also took the side of the accused. A resolution was adopted
against the indictment: the statement that "the Serbian revolutionaries
were in correspondence with accomplices in Dalmatia and Dubrovnik"
was "refuted with indignation and angrily we protest against the perse-
cutions of the Serbs in Croatia and Dalmatia". 51 In the Hungarian diet
in Budapest, on behalf of the Serbian deputies, Mihailo Polit-Desancic
stressed: "That trial for high treason in Croatia is closely connected to
the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and, on the other hand, it is
also connected to the consolidation of the posture of the actual han [.. ]
This is tyranny"52 The trial stirred up the public In Europe as well, es-
pecially the French League for the Defence of Human and Civil
Rights.c' The trial became pointless when Vienna gave up the plan to
wage war against Serbia. The convicted were abolished by the decree
of Emperor Franz Joseph I.
The second attempt to discredit the cooperation between the
Croats and the Serbs proved to be futile during the second trial Inspired
by Aehrenthal at the moment when the war with Serbia still seemed to
be inevitable. On his initiative, the Vienna historian Heinrich Fried-
jung was to bring forth the "evidence" about the subversive actions of
the Serbian government among the South Slavs, so that the attack upon
Serbia could be Justified. This was planned to discredit both the Ser-
50 T.G. Masaryk, Der Agramer Hochveratsprozess und die Annexion von Bosnien
und Herzegovina, Wien 1909.
51 Brzopisna izvjesca X'(){)(J zasjedanja Pokrajinskog sabora Dalmatinskog, Zadar
1909, September 29, 1909.
52 M.Polit-Desanci6, Besede, \'01. II, Novi Sad 1922, pp. 63-80.
53 Le proces dAgram et lopinion europe ene, Paris 1909. Cf. Scotus Viator,
(R.Seaton-Watson), Die Sudslavische Frage im Habsburger Reiche, Berlin 1913.
pp. 201 passim: M.Gross, "Hrvatska uoci aneksije Bosne i Hercegovine", in:
Istorija XY" veka, vol III, Beograd 1962, pp. 192 passim.
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bian government and the Coalition, on the basis of forged documents
Friedjung obtained through an employee of the Austrian legation In
Belgrade. After the articles had been published in Neue Freie Pre sse
and Rcichpost. the Coalition sued the historian for slander. After some
hesitation, the tnal finally took place in Vienna. and the witnesses
were the very same Serbian politicians from Belgrade mentioned in the
forged documents. It was proven that the papers were not conspirato-
rial documents, but merely low-quality forgeries.
Serbia and Montenegro: Reaction" to Annexation
The annexation violated the decisions of the Congress of Berlin.
but It was carried out In agreement with Russia. RUSSIa agreed upon
the annexation for the sake of insecure guarantees for free navigation
through the Straits. It was a skilfull diplomatic victory of Aehrenthal
over Isvolsky, the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs. Isvolsky ex-
plained to the Serbian ambassador to Paris, M. Vesnic: "You, Serbs,
could not even dream of chasing Austria-Hungary by arms out of Bos-
nia and Herzegovina. And we, the Russians, on the other hand, cannot
wage wars with them for these provinces. By this step Austria-Hun-
gary does not gain anything in fact. On the contrary, it loses an estab-
lished estate by renouncing the Sanjak of Novi Pazar and leaving it [to
Ottomans]: thus it raises the spirit of the Serbian people. for it opens
the chances of proximity between Serbia and Montenegro. This con-
ceSSIOn will occur on om request [... ] It will be followed by the revi-
sion of the Treaty of Berlin, on our request, and on that occasion
Serbia could request the rectification of its borders [...J In the year
1878 Austna accused Russia, now we shall accuse them.">' The plan
of Isvolsky to summon an international conference on the revision of
the Treaty of Berlin (Art 25 regulated the status of Bosnia-Herze-
govina) was soon abandoned, after the negative reaction from Vienna
and Berlin, and only the Idea of territorial compensation for Serbia in
Sanjak, proposed by Foreign Minister Milovanovic was retained.V'
54 V. Corovic. Odnosi izmedju ,')'rhyc i Austro-L .\!,orske tt xr veku, Beograd 1936,
pp. 221-222~ nCB. Lieven. Russia and the Origins of' the FiTst World TVar, New
York 1983. pp 33-36
55 C/ D. Popovic. Izvoljski i EJ·enta!.Diplmnafskc uspomene I:: ancksione krizc.
Beograd 1927~ \\'lvICarlg,8TCI1. lswolskv und . {cr'!/l'OIfJIUI vor Bosnisclie
.inncxionkrise. Russische IIl1d Osten cich-Lngarische Balkonpoluik. 190(,-1908.
Tlppsala 1955
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The reaction 111 Serbia was unanimous and fervent. The diplo-
matic position of the Serbs at the moment was clearly stated in an in-
terview given by Stojan Novakovic (famous historian, leader of the
Progressive Party) to Pester Lloyd: "The first impression about this
event for the Balkan peoples is that it annihilated any faith they may
have had in the justice of the European powers and the weight of inter-
national treaties and regulations [...] Since in the press of Austria-Hun-
gary, Germany and Hungary we are always treated with malevolence
and arrogance, Messrs journalists rejoice if the news from Serbia
smells of gunpowder. It seems as if in Vienna and Budapest it would
be gladly accepted if we swallowed the bait, got broken by force and
became powerless forever. But, it seems that the Austrian editors have
forgotten that we also have a few friends. In Vienna and Budapest,
Serbia and the Serbian people are too underestimated, and it is being
forgotten that underestimation may sometimes be a very dangerous
misconception. 1156
The public opinion was disposed towards a bellicose response to
the challenge from Vienna. Units of volunteers were even formed, af-
ter the example of Garibaldi's brigades; in Belgrade and the other cit-
ies of Serbia Austro-Hungarian flags were burned in protest. The
Austro-Hungarian envoy to Belgrade reported about the unanimous
readiness for war. At the demonstrations 111 Belgrade, 111 front of
20.000 people who shouted: "To the Drina' War to Austria!", the
writer Branislav Nusic read the resolution in which it was stressed that:
"Since Kosovo [meaning 1389] till this day, there has not been greater
peril for the whole Serbian people and our homeland, as it is today [...]
The citizens of Belgrade, in the name of the whole Serbian natron, of-
fer both their lives and their estates. "57 The Serbian parliament passed
the resolution, on October 12, against the annexation and emphasized
that it supported the government and would approve of all the neces-
sary measures. In Belgrade, on October 21, on the initiative of Nusic, a
patnotic society "National Defence" (Narodna odbrana) was founded
56 "Pester Lloyd". Budapest October 10, 1910. The geopolitical and demographic
aspects of the Annexation were analyzed in 1. Cvijic, The Annexation ofBosnia
and Herzegovina and the Serb problem. Translated from Serbian by 1. J.
Christitch, London, Horace Cox 1909, 38 p. + map. It was an abridged version of
Serbian original (62 pages) published in Belgrade in 1908, and also in French:
L 'annexion de la Bosnie-Herzegovine et la question serbe. Paris, Hachette 1909.
57 J. Milicevic, "Javnost Beograda prema aneksiji Bosne i Hercegovine", in:
Jugoslovenski narodi pred Prvi svetski rat, pp. 555-556~ M. Nintchitch, op.cit.,
vol L pp. 211-220.
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almost spontaneously. National Defense soon attracted many followers
owing to its demands for a more active national policy, even a war to
defend Bosnia-Herzegovina. Within a month, some 220 committees
were founded and instantly some 5.000 volunteers signed. 58 National
Defense committeese were founded also in the provinces under the Ot-
toman and Habsburg rule. After the annexation had been recognized
by Serbia, their activity was reduced to cultural and national propa-
ganda. The prestige of National Defense, and especially the fear in Vi-
enna of its conspiratorial role, were in inverse proportion to its mostly
ceremonial activities up to 1909, when its revived activities were
mainly reduced to the actions of the guerilla units (chetniks) in Old
Serbia and Macedonia.
The wave of ardent protests against the annexation flooded Mon-
tenegro. It was considered that the annexation jeopardized the future of
the entire Serbian nation, and that the survival of both Serbian states
was made directly depending on the will of the hostile bureaucracy in
Vienna. In Cetinje, before the legation of the Monarchy people cried
"Down with Austria!". In front of the Palace the demonstrators de-
manded that Prince Nikola must "lead them to the war for the Serbian
lands and Serbian rights". The Assembly of Montenegro adopted the
resolution that the annexation "had inflicted a mortal blow to the inter-
ests of the whole Serbian nation". Prince Nikola himself was overtly
bellicose in his proclamation: "The black-and-yellow sign [the colors
of Austro-Hungarian flag' over the Serbian soil will not be the border
that would in your mind and in your thoughts divide you from your
kinsmen. On the contrary, this SIgn will be the obvious symbol of in-
justice: it will make the bonds even stronger, and will be the token of
our everlasting trust in the victory of Justice. "59 The annexation crisis
put aside the old rivalry between the Serbian and the Montenegrin dy-
58 The goals of "National defense" \\ere' 1) To strengthen, encourage and enhance
national spirit: 1) to gather volunteers: 3) to form volunteering troops and prepare
them for armed actions; 4) to collect contributions, money and other means for
realizing its aims: 5) to organize, furnish and exercise special insurgent troops
(komite) aimed at special autonomous actions; 6) to enhance action in all directions of
defence of the Serbian nation" (Narodna odbrana, Beograd 1910, pp. 6-7). The
preparations of volunteers went on until March 1909, when Serbia officially
recognized the annexation In the board of Narodna odbrana were general Boza
Jankovic, the leader of the Independent Radical Partv (Samostalna radikalna
stranka) Ljubornir Davidovic. Branislax Nusic himself and the other esteemed
politicians ~nd public servants.
59 N.S. Martinovic, "Otpor naroda u Crnoj Gori aneksiji", ill: Jugoslovenskt narodi
pred Prvi svetski rat. F S03: On Mon.c.iegro cf. JD Treadway, The Falcon &
the Eagle..Montenegro end Austria-Hungary, i 908-J911. West Lafavcttc, Indiana
1983. pp. 22-39
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nasties, which had been provoked in 1907 by an obscure affair.
Namely, the Montenegrin students in Belgrade, manipulated by the
Austro-Hungarian agents, were being encouraged to carry out a coup
against Prince Nikola as an absolutist who refused to give way to the
democratic institutions. Right after the annexation crisis broke out, the
tense relations between Serbia and Montenegro were normalized and
the diplomatic and military missions were exchanged. A motion was
accepted to establish a Serbian-Montenegrin alliance, including the
joint defence in the case of war with Dual Monarchy.P''
In Bosnia-Herzegovina the events resulting from the annexation
were received in a seemingly passive way. According to the reports of
local officials, the news of the annexation was received both by the
Serbs and the Muslims with feelings of discouragement (med-
erschlagendi. It was recorded that the discontent in the provinces was
increasing and that "almost the entire population sided with Serbia".
According to Russian sources four-fifth of poplation was agains an-
nexation."! The Sarajevo garrison was alerted and 29 fresh battalions
were brought (30.000 soldiers). Eleven special "flying squads" were
formed of Muslim and Croatian volunteers for the guerilla combat
against the Serbs. By the end of March 1909, all the preparations for
the war against Serbia had been completed.V The followers of extreme
nationalist Pure Party qf Righ ts(Cista stranka prava) m Zagreb failed
to form a Croatian National Legion for the war with Serbia. "Croatian
national ustashi'' were mentioned for the first time. Emperor Franz
Joseph rejected the request of his General Staff to send an ultimatum to
Serbia before declaring war.
The reaction of the Serbs to the annexation took various forms: a
group of peasants crossed from Herzegovina to Montenegro, willing to
fight in the case of war, and a larger group of young men from Bosnia
came to Serbia with similar intentions. It was for the first time after
1882 that the Bosnian Serbs manifested their readiness for armed resis-
tance against the Monarchy.v'
Lacking external support, Serbia together WIth Montenegro tned
futilely to mternationalize the problem of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
60 M.Ekmecic, Stvaranje Jugoslavije 1790-1918, vol. II, Beograd 1989, pp.605-612
61 B. Pavicevic (ed.), Rusija i aneksiona kriza 1908-1909, CANU, Titograd 1984,
docs. No 393, 408.
62 K.B. Vynogradov, Bosnyski krizis 1908-1909, Leningrad 1964, pp. 124-126.
63 Volunteers from Bosnia, mainly the Serbs, later joined the chetnik actions 111
Macedonia. Cf. N.Sto]anovic, op.cit., p. 63.
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Stojan Novakovic went to Constantinople in order to define with the
Grand Vizier the conditions of joint resistance to the annexation. How-
ever, he failed to conclude the expected military convention. The nego-
tiations in Salonika between the emissaries of National Defence and
the leadership of the Young Turks on the common strategy in case of
war also failed. Nikola Pasic and the Crown Prince Djordje (who abdi-
cated for personal reasons in 1909) were sent to St. Petersburg to seek
the support of Emperor Nicholas II. PaSi6 was considered to be the
only Serbian politician enjoying the unlimited confidence of the Rus-
sian government. On November 10, 1908, the Russian Emperor told
Pasic that his sympathies are with Serbia, "because our [Slavic] cause
is just", but he nevertheless suggested "an agreement with Turkey and
preferably with Bulgaria, calm conduct, military preparations and wait-
ing", because RUSSIa was not prepared for war. The Balkan alliance,
including Turkey, was offered as an ideal solution for the future. The
Emperor's promise that he would not recognize the annexation encour-
aged the emissaries from Serbia, as well as the Duma (Russian Parlia-
ment) and the public opinion in Russia. The famous Russian novelist
Leo Tolstoy,64 among a number of other writers and internationally re-
nowned Russians, wrote a series of open letters, demanding for a just
solution to the Serbian question raised by the annexation.
The Foreign Minister of Serbia Milovan Milovanovic tried to ob-
tam the compensations in the Novi Pazar Sanjak and to avoid the Euro-
pean war. The request for compensations was not met with the
expected response in France and Great Britain, although it did imply
the recognition of the annexation. The Entente powers, although sym-
pathetic to Serbia, avoided the very thought of entering a war with
Austria-Hungary and Germany because of the Bosnian cnsis. The Ser-
bian public opinion, together with the leadership of the National Radi-
cal Party (Narodna radikalna strankay, the party of which Milovanovic
was a prominent member, was against the compensations. The Radi-
cals thought that Europe should be put under pressure by the threat of
war with Austria-Hungary. They considered that in accordance with
the principle of nationality autonomy should be sought for Bosnia-Her-
zegovina, as the first step towards its final union with Serbia. The mili-
tary occupation of the Novi Pazar Sanjak was proposed, which would
thus place Europe in front of efait accompli. The moment seemed fa-
64 L Tolstov, 0 prisajedinjenju Bosne i Hercegovine Austriji, Beograd, S.B.
Cvijanovic 190K
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vorable since Austria-Hungary was withdrawing its troops from the
northern part of Sanjak according to an agreement with Constanti-
nople. The final decision was, however, to accept moderate position.
The military pressure on Serbia exerted by Dual Monarchy was con-
stantly growing. As a minor incident at the border could lead to war,
the Serbian government, expecting an invasion, transferred the state ar-
chives and the treasures of the National Bank into the interior of the
country - to Nis.
In February 1909, after repeated indications that war was possi-
ble, a government was formed under the presidency of Stojan Novak-
ovic, which comprised all the parliamentary parties (with the exception
of the ephemere Socialists). The four-party government declared that it
"retains the stance that the fullfilment of the vital Serbian needs and in-
terests should be reached in a peaceful way and that, consequently, a
competent decision of the great powers will be waited for, carefully
avoiding anything that may lead to a military conflict between Serbia
and Austria-Hungary.t'F' Serbia was advised by St. Petersburg to aban-
don all the requests for territorial compensation. The government of
Montenegro was far less indulgent: Prince Nikola replied to Belgrade
that "the demands for the autonomy of Bosnia and Herzegovina should
never ever be given up", and in a reply to the Russian court he stressed
that Montenegro did not recognize the annexation retaining the right to
act independently from the decisions of the great powers.v"
Austria-Hungary achieved the recognition of the annexation with
the decisive support from Germany. Although not informed about the
preparations for the annexation, Germany promptly supported the ac-
tion of its ally. German ultimatum to Russia of March 22, 1909, neu-
tralized the European intervention. The other Entente powers were
unprepared for war: France was engaged in Morocco and hoped to pre-
vent the rapprochement of Vienna and Berlin by recognizing the an-
nexation; Great Britain remained an intermediary, calming down the
tensions in Russian-Austrian and Austrian-Serbian relations. London
merely advised that the document of Serbia's recognition of the an-
nexation should be composed in a milder form. The unconditional con-
sent of Serbia was also forced by the overt war threat. Austria-Hungary
sent 1.041.000 soldiers to the borders with Serbia and Montenegro.
65 V. Corovic, Odnosi Srbije i Austro-Ugarske u ....IT veku, p. 290.
66 C/ large documentation in: B. Pavicevic (ed.), op. cit., docs. No 346,350,
375-376.
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The Serbian resistance was crushed, seemingly forever, by the
Russian consent. The Serbian government had to give in: on March 31,
1909 a declaration was composed in Vienna and sent to Belgrade to be
signed, stating that "the new situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina does
not encroach on the rights of Serbia" .67 Every thought of compensa-
tions (territorial or railway link to the Adriatic Sea, corridor to the sea
via eastern Bosnia) became impossible
The Annexation revived the old Serbo-Croat conflict as to the
identity of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Contrary to the idea of the Yugoslav
unity and the historical closeness between Croats and Serbs, the Croa-
tian historiography was submitting "historical evidence" to the Croa-
tian character of Bosnia-Herzegovina, despite the fact that the
Catholics in these provinces, a small minority, did not develop a dis-
tinct national consciousness at the time the occupation took place. The
clerical circles in Croatia considered the Bosnian Muslims as a part of
the Croatian population, and Stjepan Radic even went to Russia lectur-
ing about the Croatian "right" to the provinces.v'' The Croatian histo-
rian Ferdo Sisic published a treatise emphasizing that "the Hungarian
claims on a direct annexation of Herzeg-Bosnia to Hungary are com-
pletely groundless. If such an importance is given to the historical
rights, then the Croatian ones are undoubtedly the most respectable. "69
67 The text of the Serbian note in the French original was :"Se referant a la note
anterieure du Gouvemement Serbe au Gouvemement Austro-Hongrois et de facon
a dissiper tout malentendu qui pourrait en etre Ie resultat, le Ministre de Serbie a
recu I' ordre de foumir les explications suivantes au Mimstere Imperial et Royal
des Affaires Etrangeres: La Serbie reconnait quellc ri'a pas ete atteinte dans ses
droits par le fait accompli cree en Bosnie-Herzcgovinc et qu elle se confonnera
par consequanr a telle decision que les Puissances prendront par rapport a l article
XXV du Traite de Berlin. Se rendant aux conseils des Grandes Puissances la
Serbie sengagc des a present ,1 abandonner I' attitude de protestation et
dopposition quelle a observee a regard de lannexion depuis I'auturnne demier
et s engage en outre 11 changer le cours de sa politique actuelle envers
lAutriche-Hongrie, pour vivre desormais avec cette derniere sur le pied d'un bon
voisinage. Confcrmement a ces declarations et confiante dans les intetntions
pacifiques de lAutrichc-Hongrie Is Serbic rarnenera son armce ,1 letat du
printemps de 191)8, en ce qUI concerne son organisation. sa dislocation et son
effectif. Elle desarmera et licenciera ses volontaires et ses bandes. et elle
ernpechera [a formation des nouvelles unites irregulieres sur son territoire."
68 S. Radio, Zivo hrvatsko pravo na Bosnu i Hercegovina, Zagreb 1908~ Radio
stressed that "Bosnia and Herzegovina must become a constitutive part of the
united Croatia (p. 59). Radics book provoked the reaction of the famous Slavist
P. Lavrov. Aneksia Bosnii i Gercegovinii i otnoshenie k nei slavianstva, St.
Petersburg. I9U 9. pp 123- i 4Ct. ..
69 F.Sisi6, Ilerccg-Bosna prigodom anck.ujc. C't:'o:sml~k()-clnograf~ko-lzistoricna i
drzavnopravna razmatrania, 7agq~b 19(1\< ,'\ historian from ~3elg.radeUniversitv,
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The national movements in the Slavic South increasingly troubled
Vienna, since the Serbs in Bosnia, along the Military Frontier, and in
Herzegovina, were impatiently waiting for further developments. The
annexation stirred and strengthened both the Serbian and the Yugoslav
movements. Repressive measures against the Serbs in Bosnia and
Croatia were multiplied. The Serbian movement in Bosnia was com-
pelled to moderation, and due to the reopening of the agrarian ques-
tion, the alliance with Muslim organizations was reduced to a cold
mutual tolerance. The governor of Bosnia-Herzegovina, General M.
Varesanin, considered the most important was to "make the Kingdom
of Serbia dependent on the Monarchy, to bring it into the relation simi-
lar to the one of Bavaria to Germany'L''' For the pro-Yugoslav youth of
Bosnia, Bogdan Zerajic, a student who, on the day the Bosman Assem-
bly was opened, failed to kill General Varesanin and then committed
suicide, became the model of national sacrifice. His example meant a
lot to the youth gathered in various revolutionary organizations,
formed after the model of Mazzinis "Young Italy". "Young Bosnia"
(Mlada Bosna) was among the numerous organizations inspired by the
revolutionary struggle against the state-sponsored terror. It assembled
the Serbs, but also Muslims and Croats of pro-Serbian or Yugoslavist
orientation. It was in its ranks that the future assassin Gavrilo Princip
was maturing.
The members of the Young Bosnia (formed around 1910), mainly
high-school and university students educated on the Russian anarchis-
tic literature (Bakunin, Chernishevsky, Lavrov, Gorky, and even
Nietzsche), decided to respond to the political violence of the Monar-
chy by revolutionary means, speeding up the process of the national
unification. Relations were established with a clandestine organization
of army officers "Unification or Death" iUjedinjenje ili smrt) - popu-
lary called the "Black Hand" ( Crna ruka) , which took over the net-
work of the National Defence committees in Bosnia soon after it was
founded in Belgrade in 1911.71
Stanoje Stanojevic, instantly replied to Sisic: "Otvoreno pismo g. Dr. Ferdu Sisicu,
profesoru hrvatske istorije na Zagrebackom univerzitetu", Politika, Belgrade,
December 23, 1908.
70 Quoted in 1. Krsnjavi, Iza kulisa hrvatske politike, vol II, Zagreb 1986, p. 582.
71 Cf D. Ljubibratic, Mlada Bosna i Sarajevski atentat, Sarajevo 1964, V. Dedijer,
Sarajevo 1914, Beograd 1964, pp. 436-540 (In the second,' enlarged edition in
1978, two volumes, like in the first edition, there is more elaborated analysis than
in the English abridged version of the first edition, The Road to Sarajevo: London
1966).
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The motives for a radical solution were numerous. From the an-
nexation to the outbreak of the Great War, 148 trials were held against
the Serbs charged with subversive actions against the sovereignty of
the Monarchy. The most numerous (60) were the trials in Banja Luka,
then in Tuzla (40), 20 in Mostar, 13 in Travnik, 8 in Sarajevo, and 7 in
Bihac. 72 The political trials affected above all the inteligentsia and citi-
zens. Only few thousands of solved cases out of 56.000 lawsuits
against serfs provoked fresh discontent among the peasantry. Even the
most moderate Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina rose against complete re-
pression symbolized by the fabricated political trials. The Serbian 20th
Annual Assembly (June 12, 1913) addressed a complaint to the
authorities that their "cultural institutions are being broken down over
night".
The Serbs were additionally homogenized by the Croato-Muslim
pact reached in 1911-1912 on the initiative of the Austro-Hungarian
authorities. The way the new coalition functioned was best manifested
in the work of the Bosnian assembly: "The Assembly ofBosnia-Herze-
govina cannot work from the moment the Muslim-Croat pact was es-
tablished and 'the Serbian hegemony' ended. Inactivity of the
Assembly is not as much conditioned by the pact itself as by its under-
lying intentions [...]. It was meant to put an end to the hegemony of the
Serbs, as Dr. Sunaric stated in public, and as a consequence, the activi-
ties of the Assembly were reduced to a minimum. [...] As long as the
blade of the Muslim-Croat pact, pointed against the Serbs, remains
sharp, as long as the only reason for this pact is to keep the Serbs under
presseure, the Assembly will live a dull life, from one crisis into an-
other. '173
The Challenge of the Balkan Wars (1912-1913)
The outcome of the First Balkan War, that marked the end of the
cooperation between the Serbs and Muslims (the latter taking sides
with the defeated Ottomans), was a great challenge to the policy of
Austria-Hungary. The unexpected victory of the Balkan Alliance and
the rapid collapse of Turkey were seen 111 Vienna as the announcement
of the forthcoming collapse of Dual Monarchy. When the Serbian
army reached the Adriatic Sea - in spite ofthe efforts the Austro-Hun-
72 Dj.Mikic, "Velcizdajnicki prvcesi U austrougarskoj politic, u Bosni 1
Hercegovi-n", in: Veleizdojnicki proces 11 Banjaluci, Banjaluka 1987, p.SS.
n "Pregled", vol XII (1,1912), January 1 i912, Sarajevo 1912. p36.
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garian diplomacy had made to prevent it - the Serbs from Herzegovina
and Bosnia gave a public statement in Bosnian Assembly which was
taken in Vienna as a dangerous manifestation of subversive activities:
"The unparalelled sacrifices and grand victories of the Serbian army
and the highly developed cultural life in the Kingdom of Serbia give a
full right to the Kingdom to take over the ancient Serbian lands, which
spread all the way to the Adriatic coast. The diplomatic attitude of
Austria-Hungary - which is claiming the autonomous rights for the un-
cultivated Albanians, although it denies them to the South Slavs in its
own state, who is trying to forbid Serbia to enjoy the fruits of its own
victories - causes the greatest discontent among all layers of the Ser-
bian society in Bosnia and Herzegovina. By expressing the feelings of
brotherhood and admiration for the kinsmen in Serbia and Montenegro,
the members of the Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina perform
their sacred duty, convinced that thereby they truly convey the feelings
of all the Serbian nation in Bosnia and Herzegovina't.I?
This is what one of the Bosnian Serb leaders, Vasilj Grdjic, wrote:
"In comparison to the events that are occurring in the Balkans, the ac-
tual situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina is of minor importance. We
all can feel it: both the Serbs, who have no other wish but to see the
Serbian kingdoms enlarged, strengthened, powerful, and their adver-
saries, who are doing their best to underestimate the Serbian people
and disdain the victories of the Serbian army, the adversaries who are
unanimously trying to work out a state for the Albanians. Hrvatski
dnevnik (The Croatian Daily) has assumed the leading part. The time
will come when the Croation people will be ashamed of having had
such shameless sons who rose against their brothers in favour of the
Albanians and their protectors, just as every decent Croat is ashamed
now of the way the Hrvatski dnevnik is writing.F'
The attitude of the Bosnian Muslims toward the Serbs and Serbia
also changed. For the Muslim masses, the Serbs have become 'the
greatest foe', almost exclusively because the Serbs "are presently at
war with Turkey, seizing its lands and being its enemy ... The Muslim
masses put all their hopes in Turkey, all their sympathies lie with Tur-
key. They love or hate whoever is Turkey's friend or enemy." In gen-
eral, their survival or fall, just as their faith in Islam, is tied up with the
Ottoman Empire.?" During the crisis that broke out over Albania in
74 Quoted in: v. Skaric, o. Hadzi-Nuric, N. Stojanovic, op.cit., pp.I46-14-7.
75 "Srpska rijec" ,January 10, Sarajevo 1913.
76 Further analysis in: M. Ekmecic, 'Impact of the Balkan Wars on Society in
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1912-1913, about 190.000 Austro-Hungarian troops were concentrated
in Bosnia, including a considerable number of soldiers mobilized in
Bosnia itself. In Sarajevo the brochure of Leopold Mandl on "Austria-
Hungary and Serbia after the Balkan War" was considered as a politi-
cal programme of the Dual Monarchy's attitude towards Serbia.
These texts against the Serbs, these slanders had to produce the
consequences. And though we are living in the age of constitution, the
Serbian people in Bosnia and Herzegovina has been exposed, since the
outbreak of the [Balkan' war, to unceassing persecutions of various
kinds which are much worse than those in the worst days of Kallay's
rule. The "traitors" have been found everywhere. Many were arrested
and still are in prison in Banja Luka, Sarajevo, Mostar and elsewhere.
Raids in search for the weapons have been made everywhere. Nor even
have the churches been spared desecration. Fines have been imposedu-
pon many and many have been arrested for the most innocent doings.
The Serbian newspapers as well as those of the opposition have been
seized as in pre-constitution times. This is what the Serbian nation in
Bosnia-Herzegovina is going through.i'"?
The sudden strengthening and territorial enlargement of Serbia re-
vived in Vienna the idea of "a preventive war",78 but the public opin-
ion throughout Europe considered it impossible to contest the war
victory of the Balkan Alliance. The German emperor Wilhelm II
stressed the fact himself, by stopping Austria-Hungary from setting
Bosnia and Herzegovina", in: B. K. Kiraly and D. Djordjevic (eds.), East Central
European Society and the Balkan Wars, Boulder Colorado 1987, pp. 26-285.
77 "Pregled", vol. XX-XXXI, Sarajevo 1913, pp. 544-555.
78 The Austro-Hungarian head-of-staff General Conrad von Hotzendorf disclosed
the suggestion in a memorandum submitted to the Emperor delivered on January
20, 1913, about the preventive war for the renewal of the prestige of the
Monarchy, endangered by the creation of the independent "Greater Serbia" and
offered the following explanation: "1. The Slavs in the Monarchy, and especially
the Yugoslavs, will search for support from the new state, a protege of Russia.
The Serbs from the Monarchy will especially tend to associate with it. In that
way, the Monarchy is in danger of losing the most important domains for its
position as a great power and for its economic development, especially its coastal
possessions along with its coastal importance. 2. The independent Serbia, merged
with Montenegro, presents a respectable military force. 3. The renewed esteem of
Serbia inflicted a mighty blow to the morale of the Monarchy, not only in the
Balkans, in Bosnia, Herzegovina and Dalmatia, in its own domains, but also in the
eyes of the world. This blow significantly reduced the importance of the
Monarchy as an ally, and consequently its political and economic value. We
should not keep delusions, in spite of our so-called diplomatic success [...] 4. This
reduction of esteem bears effect on all the patriots, especially in the army"
(Feldmarschal Conrad, Aus meiner Dienstzeit, Wien 1923, vol. III, pp)2-l6).
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onto the war-path. Among the Bosnian youth, not only Serbs, the ex-
pectations rose, sometimes even at the verge of exaltation. A Serbian
youth newspaper wrote in 1913: "Serbia honorably and courageously
made a step towards the Serbian unification. Now, it has to get
strength, stand up and refresh, for still numerous are the great deeds
ahead" 79
Certain measures of the Austro-Hungarian authorities provoked
additional tension. Revokement of the post of civil adlatus in 1912 was
an introduction into "the emergency measures" (Ausnahmsverfugungv;
for all the power was now laid in the hands of a military governor who
was considered as the head of the provinces. This man, Oscar von
Potiorek, was no longer responsible to the Common Ministry of Fi-
nance, but to the War Ministry in Vienna. When every illusion of a
civil state disappeared, a group of the most moderate Serbs led by Gli-
gorije Jeftanovic left the Bosnian Assembly, a body with quite limited
power. They were replaced with the so-called "loyal Serbs", led by
Dando Dimovic, whose influence among the people was almost nil.
During the period from the introduction of the emergency measures in
May 1913 (motivated by the Scutari crisis and the threat of Austria-
Hungary to enter a war with Serbia and Montenegro) to the assassina-
tion in Sarajevo in June 1914, Potiorek tried to organize another series
of trials for high treason in Bijeljina, Foca and Banja Luka.f" All sorts
of organizations were put under a ban, musical and sport associations,
as well as religious and educational. Out of 710 associations in Bosnia
considered to be entirely controlled by the Serbs (396 Serbian, 230 of
mixed membership), the majority bore the brunt. One of the partici-
pants in the assassination of Franz Ferdinand considered that their ac-
tion was a logical reaction to the "emergency measures". 81
79 Quoted in: V.Corovic, Istorija Srba, vol. III, Beograd 1989.
80 Dj. Mikic, op.cit., pp.51-68.
81 V.Bogicevi6, Sarajevski atentat. Stenogram glavne rasprave, Sarajevo 1985, p.
133. Cf standard pro-Austrian explanation: J. Remak, "1914: The Third Balkan
War - Origins Reconsidered", Journal of Modem History, vol. 43 (1971), pp.
353-366. Cj also a more balanced approach by Z.AB. Zeman, "The Balkans and
the Coming of War", in: R. 1. W. Evans and H. Pogge von Strandmann, The
Coming ofthe First Word War, Oxford 1991, pp. 19-32.
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CprrCKO IUITalhC y BOCUII II Xcpu,eroBIIHII, op; oxynauaje 1878. p;o 1I36u-
jan.a CBCTCKor paTa 1914, 6lL10 je y ananajyhua xpyroaasra Aycrpoyrapcxe
p;O)KlIBJbaBaUO xao jemra op; CIaBUIIX npenpexa cTa6uJIII30BaIhY IhCUC
pcnpecnnne, no.ryxo.romrjanne II arrrnnexroxparcxe yrrpaBe. Y rrO':UITIIu,U
CIICTCMaTCKOf rrOTIICKIIBalba Cp6a, Ilnojaa xrouapxtrja jc 3aBCJIa HIB xrepa pana
cysoajas,a IhIIXOBor Hau,UOHaTIHOf ocehan.a - op; orpananasaa,a U,pKBCHO-
IIIKOJICKC ayronoxrnje II BCpCKIIX nporona no ycxpahnsau,a no.rrrraxax npasa II
nopnnaa,a rrocrojan.a cprrcKor UP;CHTIITCTa HaMCTaIhCM HOBor "60caHCKor"
xao 3ajeAHII'lKOf ofipacna sa crnapan,e HOBe "fiocaacxe nannje". BC3 aKTIIBHe
IlOP;pIIIKC 113 Cp6IIjC If IJpHe Tope CBC no anexcnje 1908, 60caucKu II xepue-
rona-rxn Cp6II cy na cepnje nparncaxa II nporona oKyrraIl,lIOHILX BJlaCTII OP;fO-
BOpIIJIII 60p60M sa HaIl,lIOHa.JIHa rrpasa xoja ce onnajana y TpII cyxnecasne
rpaac: 60p60M sa sepcxy II npxseno-mxoncxy ayroaosrnjy, IlOJIIITIIqKIIM op-
raHII30BalbeM II KyJITypHIIM Y3p;II3aIheM II rra xpajy, pCBOJIYIl,lIOHapHIIM ax-
TIIBHOCTIIMa II TepOpIICTIIqKIIM axnajaxra, 1{IITaB noxper A06IIO je CHa)KaU
saxrax II IIIIIpOKY nonprnxy y napony aaxnan.yjyha rrOJIIITIIIJ;II oKyrraIl,IIOHIIX
BJIaCTII, a 3aTIIM II HcpeIIIeHoM arpapnosr IIIITaIhY xoje je 60p6II sa HaIJ;IIOHaJIHa
npaaa p;aBano caaxcny cormjanrry P;IIMcH3IIjy. Tlocne Y3acTorrHIIX aeycnexa na
ce cyK06 npennana, OAHOC Cp6a npesra BJIaCTIIMa UBojHe MOHapxIIjc, nocefino
IIOCJle penpecananx xrepa yBep;cHIIX HaKOH anexcaje Ii ysohen,a saupenaor
cran.a 1l0CJIe BaJIKaHCKIIX parona, HCMIIHOBHO je BOP;IiO y eKCIL103lIBaH cyK06 y
KOjcM he ce CYK06IITII Aycrpo-Yrapcxa Ii Cpfiaja, CaM aTCHTaT y Capajesy
1914, p;0)KJIBJbaBan je xao noru-ma peaxnnja na naapenno cran,e, yxanan,e
cprrcxnx IIHcTIITYIJ,IIja rr cepnjy BeJIeII3p;ajHIi'lKIIX nponcca rrporna OMJlap;IUI-
CKIIX II rraTpIIoTcKIIX npynrrasa.
